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Abstract
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the international agreements 
on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is 
implemented mainly by the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK). In addition, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment (MEAE), have their roles in safeguards. During 2018, STUK together with the 
ministries strengthened national cooperation in the areas of non-proliferation, export control and 
nuclear disarmament.
Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather 
limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland reside at 
the nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the shut-down research reactor 
in Espoo with nuclear fuel at the site, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their visits to the 
construction site of the Olkiluoto 3 unit and installed safeguards instrumentation before the first fuel 
delivery that took place in 2017. The initial inventory verification of the new reactor unit was carried 
out in February 2018.
A new category of nuclear material holder was initiated in 2018 owing to the decision of the MEAE 
that all production source material grade uranium in the metal industry must be licensed according to 
Finnish nuclear energy legislation. STUK therefore granted operating licences to the Boliden Group’s 
Zinc and Copper production units at Kokkola and Harjavalta, owing to the uranium-rich intermediate 
copper product. These operations and materials are not considered by the European Commission and 
are excluded from the EU Safeguards Regulation owing to the non-nuclear use of the source material.
STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities 
in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, European Union 
Safeguards Regulation and international agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland 
can assure itself and the international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and 
materials. In addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the 
European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2018 continued to demonstrate 
that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of un-
declared nuclear materials or activities, and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance 
with the stakeholders’ declarations. 
The number of routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been reduced signif-
icantly due to the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which has been in force since 2008. The 
number of international inspection days per year is approximately 25. According to the statements on 
inspection results and the conclusion of safeguards implementation provided by the IAEA and the Com-
mission, neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks or required any actions. However, at 
the end of 2018 there was an unresolved request for clarification concerning findings after the activities 
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carried out by the IAEA in April 2018. This clarification was consequently prepared and provided to the 
IAEA in early 2019. In addition, there were a few other follow-ups pending owing to equipment main-
tenance needs. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, the stakeholders 
enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safe-
guards. In safeguards, STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days. 
A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)-related activities is the 
entry into force of the CTBT itself. An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that 
the verification system of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is func-
tioning and able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear 
test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, so that the 
verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
Human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2018 was focused on a 
comprehensive competence development taking into account the risk assessment of certain areas of 
expertise and the ability of personnel to cope at work. The objective is to ensure the necessary human 
resources now and in the future and to develop the work and work flows to fulfil STUK’s strategy for 
2018–2022 with emphasis on the strategic target of ‘having the happiest civil servants in the world’. As a 
continuation of technical development work, due to the need to regulate the construction of the disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site, safeguards instrumentation was under 
development, in particular passive gamma emission tomography and passive neutron albedo reactivity 
measurement for the verification of spent fuel. 
In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for authorities that 
represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production or nuclear power in cooperation 
with the IAEA. STUK also contributed to EU-funded projects in Tanzania and Vietnam, respectively. 
In 2018, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy 
(K.A.CARE), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK continued supporting the establishment of Saudi 
Arabia’s regulatory authority in relation to its nuclear energy programme.
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Preface
Every year, STUK prepares the report on Implementing Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Finland. The main 
function of the report is to inform and share experiences with colleagues and interested parties on 
safeguards implementation. 
In this current setting, Chapter 2 presents the Finnish system and the relevant stakeholders to 
new readers in a concise way. Chapter 3 presents the safeguards activities at the operators and other 
stakeholders. Development work and other activities are dealt with later in the report. STUK’s activities 
concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and nuclear disarmament are included in report. 
The report is compiled by the staff members of the Safeguards Section of STUK. The inspectors in 
the office have specific oversight tasks and duties towards individual operators and stakeholders, so all 
staff members contribute to the reporting. The Section Head is Marko Hämäläinen and the responsible 
officers for nuclear material holders in 2018 were Henri Niittymäki for Loviisa NPP, Timo Ansaranta for 
Olkiluoto NPP, Tapani Honkamaa for the new Olkiluoto 3 unit and the FV Hanhikivi NPP project, Mikael 
Moring and Olli Okko for the encapsulation plant and geological repository in Olkiluoto, Henri Niittymäki 
for the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) and for minor holders, Hanna Tuovinen for R&D at 
installations possessing nuclear materials, and Olli Okko for nuclear material producers. There are dep-
uty arrangements in place in order to ensure instant duplicate knowledge. Not all the necessary actions 
and responsibilities, such as licensing and approvals, are covered in this list of facility-specific tasks.
In addition, there are several additional tasks related to safeguards and nuclear-non proliferation, 
which are taken care of by various experts of STUK. In particular, the Support Programme to the IAEA 
contributes to the international safeguards R&D work. Mr Honkamaa acts as support programme co-
ordinator and prepares its annual report and the highlights in this report. Mr Moring is responsible for 
the Finnish National Data Centre to the CTBTO and, of STUK’s other departments, Kari Peräjärvi con-
tributes to GICNT and IPNDV activities included in this report. At the beginning of 2018, the domestic 
non-proliferation co-operation between ministries and STUK was strengthened by appointing Elina 
Martikka to improve this co-operation in her new position. Marko Hämäläinen took over the Safeguards 
Section as section head, and Alice Salonen took care of the supporting activities of the inspections and 
other activities in the section as a new assistant. The contents of this annual report can be expected 
to the reflect these changes in future. Comments and suggestions are welcome to improve the content 
and normativity of the report.
The Editor
6 STUK-B 233 / May 2019
Contents
aBSTRaCT  3
PREFaCE  5
1 IMPLEMENTaTION OF NUCLEaR NON-PROLIFERaTION IN FINLaND 9
1.1 INTERNaTIONaL SaFEGUaRDS aGREEMENTS aND NaTIONaL LEGISLaTION 9
1.2 PaRTIES OF THE FINNISH SaFEGUaRDS SySTEM 10
1.2.1 MINISTRIES 10
1.2.2 STUK 11
1.2.3 LICENCE HOLDERS aND OTHER USERS OF NUCLEaR ENERGy 12
1.3 IaEa aND EURaTOM SaFEGUaRDS IN FINLaND 20
1.5 CONTROL OF URaNIUM aND THORIUM PRODUCTION 21
1.6 LICENSING aND EXPORT/IMPORT CONTROL OF DUaL-USE GOODS 21
1.7 CONTROL OF NUCLEaR MaTERIaL TRaNSPORT 22
1.8 NUCLEaR SaFEGUaRDS aND SECURITy STRENGTHEN EaCH OTHER 22
2 SaFEGUaRDS aCTIVITIES IN 2018 23
2.1 THE REGULaTORy CONTROL OF NUCLEaR MaTERIaLS 23
2.2 GENERaL SaFEGUaRDS aCTIVITIES 24
2.2.1 aDDITIONaL PROTOCOL DECLaRaTIONS  24
2.2.2 aPPROVaLS OF NEW INTERNaTIONaL INSPECTORS 24
2.2.3 NUCLEaR DUaL-USE ITEMS, EXPORT LICENCES  25
2.2.4 TRaNSPORT OF NUCLEaR MaTERIaLS 25
2.2.5 INTERNaTIONaL TRaNSFERS OF NUCLEaR MaTERIaL 25
7STUK-B 233 / May 2019
2.3 SaFEGUaRDS IMPLEMENTaTION aT THE STaKEHOLDERS 25
2.3.1 LOVIISa NUCLEaR POWER PLaNT 25
2.3.2 OLKILUOTO NUCLEaR POWER PLaNT  26
2.3.2 THE HaNHIKIVI NUCLEaR POWER PLaNT PROJECT 26
2.3.4 VTT 27
2.3.5 STUK 27
2.3.6 UNIVERSITy OF HELSINKI 27
2.3.7 MINOR NUCLEaR MaTERIaL HOLDERS 28
2.3.8 FRONT-END FUEL CyCLE OPERaTORS 28
2.3.9 THE DISPOSaL FaCILITy FOR SPENT NUCLEaR FUEL 28
2.3.10 OTHER STaKEHOLDERS 29
3 DEVELOPMENT WORK IN 2018 30
3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF WORKING PRaCTICES  30
3.2 SUPPORT PROGRaMME TO THE IaEa SaFEGUaRDS 31
3.3 INTERNaTIONaL COOPERaTION aND SERVICES 33
3.4 SPENT FUEL DISPOSaL aND GOSSER R&D PROJECT 34
3.4 GICNT– GLOBaL INITIaTIVE TO COMBaT NUCLEaR TERRORISM 35
3.5 IPNDV– INTERNaTIONaL PaRTNERSHIP FOR NUCLEaR DISaRMaMENT VERIFICaTION 35
3.6 NSG – NUCLEaR SUPPLIERS GROUP 35
3.7 NPT PREPaRaTORy COMMITTEE 36
4 NaTIONaL DaTa CENTRE FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEaR-TEST-BaN TREaTy (FINDC) 37
4.1 INTERNaTIONaL COOPERaTION THE FOUNDaTION OF CTBT VERIFICaTION 38
4.2 THE aNaLySIS PIPELINE a WELL-ESTaBLISHED DaILy ROUTINE 38
8 STUK-B 233 / May 2019
5 SUMMaRy 39
6 PUBLICaTIONS 41
7 aBBREVIaTIONS aND aCRONyMS 43
aPPENDIX 1 NUCLEaR MaTERIaLS IN FINLaND 2018 46
aPPENDIX 2 SaFEGUaRDS FIELD aCTIVITIES IN 2018 47
aPPENDIX 3 International agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland 48
9STUK-B 233 / May 2019
1 Implementation of nuclear non-
proliferation in Finland
The regulatory control of nuclear materials, nuclear safeguards, is a prerequisite for the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy in Finland. In order for Finland to have a nuclear industry, most of which consists of 
nuclear energy production, it must be ensured that nuclear materials, equipment and technology are 
used only for their declared peaceful purposes. The basis of nuclear safeguards is the national system 
for the regulatory control of nuclear materials and activities. Nuclear safeguards represent an integral 
part of nuclear safety and nuclear security and are applied to both large- and medium-sized nuclear in-
dustry and to small-scale nuclear material activities. Along with the safeguards, the regulatory process 
for nuclear non-proliferation includes transport control, export control, border control, international 
cooperation, and monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and the reporting of 
nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are 
the facilities that use nuclear materials, often referred to as ‘licence holders’ or ‘operators’ and the state 
authority, STUK. A licence holder must take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority 
must provide the regulatory control to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the requirements. The con-
trol of nuclear expert organisations, technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the non-proliferation 
of sensitive technology, is also a growing global challenge for all stakeholders. In Finnish legislation, all 
these stakeholders are dealt with as users of nuclear energy. 
Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is rather 
limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) in Finland reside at 
the nuclear power plants at Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the research reactor in Espoo 
with nuclear materials, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. Most of the applied 
nuclear research and development activities are carried out to improve the maintenance and safety of 
the nuclear power plants.
1.1 International safeguards agreements and national legislation
Nuclear safeguards are based on international agreements, the most important and extensive of which 
is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). The Treaty 
Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is the basis for the nuclear safe-
guards system of the European Union (EU). Finland is bound by both these treaties, and also has several 
bilateral agreements in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. When Finland joined the EU, the 
bilateral agreements with Australia, Canada and the USA were partly replaced by the corresponding 
Euratom agreements (see Appendix 3 for the relevant legislation). 
Finland was the first state where an INFCIRC/153-type comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with 
the IAEA entered into force (INFCIRC/155, 9 February 1972). When Finland joined the EU (1 January 1995), 
this agreement was suspended and subsequently the Safeguards Agreement between the non-nuclear 
weapon Member States of the EU, the Euratom and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) entered into force in Fin-
land on 1 October 1995. Finland signed the Additional Protocol (AP) to the INFCIRC/193 in Vienna on 
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22 September 1998 with the other EU Member States and ratified it on 8 August 2000. The Additional 
Protocol entered into force on 30 April 2004, once all the EU Member States had ratified it. The scope 
and mandate for Euratom safeguards are defined in the European Commission Regulation No. 302/2005.
After Finland joined the EU as a Member State and thereby subjected itself to the Euratom safe-
guards, a comprehensive national safeguards system continued to be maintained and further developed. 
The basic motivation for this is the responsibility assumed by Finland for its safeguards and security 
under the obligations of the NPT, and also to ensure fulfilment of the Euratom requirements.
The national safeguards derive their mandate and scope from the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and 
Decree. The operator’s obligation to have a nuclear material accountancy system and the right of STUK 
to oversee the planning and generation of design information for new facilities was introduced from 
STUK requirements into the Nuclear Energy Decree. 
In 2015, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended in such a way that the government decrees on nuclear 
safety, nuclear waste management, emergency preparedness and nuclear security were replaced by new 
STUK regulations. In addition, the new STUK regulation on the Safety of Mining and Milling Operations 
Aimed at Producing Uranium or Thorium also entered into force on 1 January 2016. 
As stipulated by the act, STUK issues detailed requirements (YVL Guides) on safety, security and 
safeguards that apply to the use of nuclear energy. STUK’s safeguards requirements for all users of nu-
clear energy during all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle are set in YVL Guide D.1 Regulatory Control of 
Nuclear Safeguards issued in 2013. The guide was updated in 2018, and a new version will be published 
in 2019. Areas covered in the new comprehensive guide include the obligations and measures stemming 
from the Additional Protocol for the Safeguards Agreement and from recent developments. All stake-
holders must describe their own safeguards system in written form (as a nuclear materials handbook 
or safeguards manual), in order to facilitate their task of fulfilling their obligations and to guarantee 
the effective and comprehensive operation of the national safeguards system. In the new guide, there 
are also specific national requirements for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in a geological repository. 
In general, nuclear safeguards control applies to:
• nuclear material (special fissionable material and source material)
• nuclear dual-use items (non-nuclear materials, components, equipment and technology suitable 
for producing nuclear energy or nuclear weapons as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
• licence holders’ activities, expertise, preparedness and competence including information 
security
• R&D and other activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle as defined in the Additional Protocol
• the design and construction of new nuclear facilities.
1.2 Parties of the Finnish safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish safeguards system are the authorities and stakeholders. Undis-
tributed responsibility for the safety, security and safeguards of the use of nuclear energy rests with the 
stakeholder. It is the responsibility of STUK as the state regulatory authority to ensure that the licence 
holders and all other stakeholders in the nuclear field comply with the requirements of the law and the 
nuclear safeguards agreements. To complement the national effort, international control is necessary 
in order to demonstrate credibility and the proper functioning of the national safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsible for national non-proliferation policy and inter-
national agreements. The MFA is responsible for the export control of nuclear materials and other 
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nuclear dual-use items, including sensitive nuclear technology. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE) is responsible for the supreme command and control of nuclear matters. MEAE is 
responsible for the legislation related to nuclear energy and is also the competent authority mentioned 
in the Euratom Treaty. Other ministries, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence, 
also contribute to the efficient functioning of the national nuclear safeguards system.
1.2.2 STUK
As per the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK is responsible for maintaining the national nuclear safe-
guards system in order to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates the stakeholders’ 
activities and ensures that the obligations of international agreements concerning the peaceful use of 
nuclear materials are met. Regulatory control by STUK includes the possession, use, production, transfer 
(national and international), handling, storage, transport, export and import of nuclear materials and 
nuclear dual-use items. STUK is in charge of Finland’s approval and consultation process for inspectors 
from the IAEA and the European Commission. 
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials Section of STUK cover all typical measures of a State 
System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), together with many other activities. 
STUK reviews the stakeholders’ reports (operational notifications, inventory reports), inspects their 
accountancy, facilities and transport arrangements on site, and performs system audits. STUK runs a 
verification programme for nuclear activities to assess the completeness and correctness of the decla-
rations by the licence holders. STUK acts proactively in order to avoid or solve in advance any foreseeable 
issues that may be raised by the international inspectorates. Nuclear safeguards on the national level 
are closely linked to other functions of nuclear materials control and non-proliferation: licensing, export 
control, border control, transport control, combating illicit trafficking, physical protection of nuclear 
materials, monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Nuclear safety and particularly nuclear security 
objectives are closely complemented by safeguards objectives. For this reason, the research and regulatory 
units in the fields of safety, security and safeguards at STUK cooperate within the non-proliferation 
framework. The scope of non-proliferation work is linked to many organisational units of STUK (Fig. 1). 
Public Affairs
Director General
FIGURE 1. Framework to implement nuclear non-proliferation within STUK’s organisation.
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The distribution of the working days of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section in the different 
duty areas is presented in Figure 2. Most of the working days are invoiced to the stakeholders. As seen 
in Figure 2, the duty areas are divided into those of direct oversight and inspections (basic operations), 
support functions including maintenance, development work for the regulatory functions and consul-
tancy, including international cooperation financed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or the European 
Union. However, the state budgetary funding constitutes only about 5% of the total funding of the 
Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section.
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by its nature, an international domain. STUK therefore actively par-
ticipates in international nuclear safeguards-related cooperation and development efforts, and also 
participates in the European Safeguards Research and Development Association’s ESARDA’s working 
groups, executive board and the steering committee. The practices adopted in the current nuclear con-
struction projects have emphasised the need to bring in the safeguards requirements at an early stage 
of facility design. The experience has been shared with the IAEA, in several international fora and also 
in bilateral cooperation with several countries.
1.2.3 Licence holders and other users of nuclear energy
The essential parts of the national safeguards system are the licence holders and other users of nuclear 
energy – in nuclear terminology, often called the operators and other stakeholders. In Finnish legisla-
tion, the term ’use of nuclear energy’ comprises a wide range of nuclear-related activities, such as those 
defined in the Addition Protocol. These stakeholders, in particular the licence holders, perform key func-
tions in the national safeguards system: control of the authentic source data of their nuclear materials 
in addition to accountancy for nuclear materials at the facility level for each of their material balance 
areas (MBA). Each licence holder or other user of nuclear energy must operate its safeguards system in 
accordance with its own nuclear materials handbook or safeguards manual. The requirements of the 
Additional Protocol are integrated into the handbook to facilitate implementation of safeguards at the 
site, including the material balance areas. Other stakeholders too, as users of nuclear energy, are requested 
to have a safeguards manual to facilitate safeguards implementation. The nuclear materials handbook 
or safeguards manual is part of the operator’s quality system and is reviewed and approved by STUK.
In Finland, there are about 30 stakeholders responsible for nuclear material accountancy and 
control. The major material balance areas are listed in Table 1 and described in greater detail below. 
Most of the nuclear materials in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants at Loviisa and Olkiluo-
to. The amounts of nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland in 1990–2018 are presented in 
539; 33 %
163; 10 %
85; 5 %
598; 37 %
247; 15 %
Distribution of working days
Direct oversight and inspections
Expert services
Budgetary funding
Support functions
Vacations and absences
FIGURE 2. The distribution of the working days of the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section in the various duty areas.
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Figures 3 and 4. Currently there are six sites in the sense of the Additional Protocol: the two nuclear pow-
er plant sites, the geological repository site in Olkiluoto, and three minor sites: the Technical Research 
Centre of Finland, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority and the Laboratory of Radiochemistry 
at the University of Helsinki. 
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) submitted by a licence holder or by other stakehold-
er as groundwork, the European Commission adopts particular safeguards provisions (PSP) for that 
licence holder or stakeholder. PSPs are drawn taking operational and technical constraints into account 
in close consultation with both the person or undertaking concerned and the relevant member state. 
Until PSPs are adopted, the undertaking must apply the general provisions of Commission Regulation 
No. 302/2005. A facility attachment (FA) is prepared in cooperation with the IAEA for each facility to 
describe arrangements specific to that facility. The status of the regulatory documents for the Finnish 
material balance areas is shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Status of regulatory documents for material balance areas in Finland at the end of 2018.
MBA, 
location
BTC, last 
upd.
Site (AP), 
founded
PSP, in force FA, in 
force
Licence/DiP,  
in force (from/until)
SG Manual,  
approved update
WL0V, 
Loviisa
15.5.2017 S SF L0VI, 
8.7.2004
yes,  
4.5.1998
No Operating,  
LO1 until 31.12.2027 
LO2 until 31.12.2030
12.2.2016
W0L1, 
Olkiluoto
22.8.2018 S SF 0LKI, 
8.7.2004
yes,  
7.6.2007
No Operating,  
until 31.12.2038
31.10.2018
W0L2, 
Olkiluoto
22.8.2018 S SF 0LKI, 
8.7.2004
yes,  
7.6.2007
No Operating,  
until 31.12.2038
31.10.2018
W0LS, 
Olkiluoto
22.8.2018 S SF 0LKI, 
8.7.2004
yes,  
7.6.2007
No Operating,  
until 31.12.2038
31.10.2018
W0L3, 
Olkiluoto
22.8.2018 S SF 0LKI, 
8.7.2004
No No Construction,  
granted 17.2.2005
31.10.2018
W0LE, 
Olkiluoto
19.5.2017 S SF POSI, 
31.3.2010
No No Construction,  
12.11.2015
Included in  
W0LF manual
W0LF, 
Olkiluoto
13.12.2017 S SF POSI, 
31.3.2010
No No Construction,  
12.11.2015
9.6.2017
WFV1, 
Pyhäjoki
3.2.2017 No No No DiP,  
1.7.2010
20.4.2018
WRRF, 
Espoo
31.12.2014 S SF VTTI, 
8.7.2004
yes,  
9.7.1998
No Operating,  
until 31.12.2023
12.4.2017
WNSC, 
Espoo
13.6.2018 Included 2017 
to SSF VTTI
No No Operating,  
until 31.12.2026
14.11.2016
WFRS, 
Helsinki
1.3.2017 S SF STUK,
8.7.2004
No No Not required  
(as an authority)
17.2.2017
WHEL, 
Helsinki
21.12.2016 S SF HyRL,
8.7.2004
No No Operating,  
until 31.12.2027
26.2.2018 
WKK0, 
Kokkola
30.5.2013 No No No Operating,  
until 31.12.2024
18.6.2015
WNNH, 
Harjavalta
16.1.2018 No No No Operating,  
until 31.12.2019
18.6.2015
WTaL,
Terrafame
14.9.2017 No No No Operating (pilot test),  
until 30.6.2023
6.11.2017
WDPJ,
Jyväskylä
10.3.2017 No No No Operating,
until 31.12.2024
24.9.2018
 
Finnish material balance areas and their status as 31.12.2018. MBa (material balance area code), BTC (Basic Technical 
Characteristics, i.e. Design Information), aP (the additional Protocol), PSP (Particular Safeguards Provisions set by the European 
Commission), Fa (Facility attachment prepared by the IaEa), DiP (Decision-in-Principle, date of Parliament approval, in force 5 
years).
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FIGURE 3. Uranium accumulation in Finland in 1990–2018.
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FIGURE 4. Plutonium in spent nuclear fuel in Finland in 1990–2018.
Fortum (MBA WL0V)
The nuclear power plant operated by Fortum Power and Heat is located on Hästholmen Island in Loviisa 
on the southeast coast of Finland. This first NPP was built in Finland in the 1970s to host two VVER-440 
type power reactor units. These two units share common fresh and spent fuel storages. For nuclear safe-
guards accountancy purposes, the entire NPP is counted as one material balance area (MBA code WL0V). 
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has been imported from the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. 
The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP was returned to the Soviet Union/Russian Federation until 1996 and 
since then has been stored in the interim storage due to a change in Finnish nuclear legislation, which 
forbids the import and export of nuclear waste in general, including spent fuel.
As per the requirements of the Additional Protocol, the Loviisa NPP site (SSFLOVI) comprises 
Hästholmen Island as a whole and extends to the main gate on the mainland. Particular Safeguards 
Provisions for the Loviisa NPP, which define the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards procedures 
for the facility, have been in force since 1998. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards Agreement 
INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared by the IAEA for the Loviisa NPP.
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Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, W0L2, W0LS, and W0L3)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and operates a nuclear power plant on Olkiluoto Island in Eurajoki 
on the west coast of Finland. The Olkiluoto NPP consists of two nuclear power reactor units and an 
interim spent fuel storage. Olkiluoto 1 was connected to the electricity grid in 1978 and Olkiluoto 2 in 
1980. There are three active material balance areas (MBA codes W0L1, W0L2, W0LS) at the Olkiluoto NPP.
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian origin. 
This uranium is enriched in the Russian Federation or in the EU, and the fuel assemblies are manufac-
tured in Germany and Sweden.
The Finnish Government granted a licence to construct a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3 in 2005. 
As a part of the licensing process, TVO’s plan for arranging the necessary measures to prevent the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons was approved by STUK. The European Commission has assigned the MBA 
code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3. TVO submitted the operating licence application to the Government in April 
2016 with the aim of having the unit commissioned in 2018. The first fresh fuel for the first loading was 
received to OL3 in October 2017 and the initial inventory was verified in February 2018. The current 
estimate for the beginning of energy production is in early 2020.
TVO owns most of the area of Olkiluoto Island, but the NPP site (SSFOLKI) as per the requirements 
of the Additional Protocol currently comprises the fenced areas around the reactor units, the spent fuel 
storage and the storage for low- and intermediate-level waste, and the Olkiluoto 3 construction site. Par-
ticular Safeguards Provisions for the Olkiluoto NPP have been in force since 2007. The Facility Attachment 
of the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared by the IAEA for the Olkiluoto NPP.
Fennovoima (MBA WFV1) 
Fennovoima was founded in 2007 as a new nuclear power operator in Finland. The Government approved 
a Decision-in-Principle in 2010 for the new operator Fennovoima to construct a new nuclear power plant 
at a new site. The preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) were submitted to the European 
Commission in summer 2013, and the MBA code WFV1 was assigned to the future material balance area 
once the selection of the future Hanhikivi site at Pyhäjoki was decided. Fennovoima submitted the con-
struction licence application to the Government in June 2015. Provision of the necessary information to 
STUK, required for construction licence as per Nuclear Energy Decree 35§, has been delayed. Fennovoima 
expects the construction licence to be granted in 2021. The first Hanhikivi site declaration (according to 
the Additional Protocol) will be submitted once the construction licence has been granted.
VTT (MBAs WRRF and WNSC)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located at facilities other than nuclear power plants. The most 
significant of these facilities is the VTT (Technical Research Centre of Finland) research reactor FiR1 
(MBA code WRRF), located in Otaniemi, Espoo. The research reactor was the first nuclear reactor built 
in Finland. In 2012, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy and VTT announced the plan to close 
down the reactor and to launch the decommissioning process. The reactor was shut down and made 
subcritical in 2015.
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards proce-
dures for the facility have been in force for VTT FiR1 since 1998. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared by the IAEA for the research reactor. 
In contrast to this, a new building, the VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, for experimental nuclear re-
search was built at the Espoo premises of VTT. The preliminary BTC for the new building was submitted 
to the Commission at the end of 2014, and the MBA code WNSC was subsequently assigned to the future 
material balance area in 2015. STUK granted the operating licence in 2016 for the VTT Centre for Nuclear 
Safety, and nuclear materials were moved to the new building in 2017. The commissioning of the new 
laboratories is advancing in steps. Both these decisions will have long-lasting effects, due to the need for 
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Major nuclear installations in Finland
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Plan tunit Start-up National grid Nominal electric power 
(gross/net, MW)
Type, supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb 1977 9 May 1977 531/507 Pressurised water reactor (PWR),  
atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1981 531/507 Pressurised water reactor (PWR),  
atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Plan tunit Start-up National grid Nominal electric power 
(gross/net, MW)
Type, supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 1979 920/890 Boiling water reactor (BWR), asea atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 920/890 Boiling water reactor (BWR), asea atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction licence granted 
17 Feb 2005
approx. 1,600 (net) Pressurised water reactor (PWR), areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki,  
and the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction.
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Hanhikivi nuclear facility project
Plant unit Supplemented  
Decision-In-Principle approved
Nominal electric power, 
net (MW)
Type, supplier
Hanhikivi 1 5 Dec 2014 approx. 1200 Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), ROSaTOM
Hanhikivi nuclear power plant FH1 is a power plant project of Fennovoima.
Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and geological repository
The planned facility under construction will consist of a surface facility for the encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel and  
a geological repository for disposal of the fuel in the underground at a depth of appr. 420 metres.
FiR 1 research reactor
Facility Thermal power In operation Fuel Triga fuel type
TRIGa Mark II  
research reactor
250 kW March 1962 – June 
2015
Reactor core consists 
of 80 fuel rods which 
contain 15 kg of uranium
Uranium–zirkonium hybrid 
combination: 8% uranium, 91% 
zirkonium and 1% hydrogen
The FiR 1 research reactor, operated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, was commissioned in March 1962. VTT 
stopped using the reactor in June 2015 and placed it in permanent shutdown. VTT submitted the operating licence application 
for the decommissioning phase to the Government in June 2017.
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licences, permits, contracts and environmental impact assessment. This also affects safeguards, as the 
nuclear materials must be kept under the control of competent personnel in both material balance areas.
The VTT site (SSFVTTI) at the reactor, as per the requirements of the Additional Protocol, currently 
consists of the whole building around the research reactor, although there are non-nuclear companies 
and university premises in the same building.
STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), 
mainly materials no longer in use and hence taken into STUK’s custody. STUK was founded in 1958 and 
has been located at its current premises in Roihupelto, Helsinki since 1994. The STUK MBA (WFRS) 
consists of the STUK headquarters and the ‘Central interim storage for small-user radioactive waste’ at 
the Olkiluoto NPP site.
The STUK site (SSFSTUK), as per the requirements of the Additional Protocol, consists of the 
premises of STUK’s headquarters located in Helsinki. The storage at Olkiluoto is included in the NPP’s 
site declaration.
The University of Helsinki (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki (HYRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. The laboratory is located on the Kumpula university campus in Helsinki. The University’s 
internal structure was reorganised in 2017, and the current licence holder is the Department of Chemistry.
The HYRL site (SSFHYRL), as per the requirements of the Additional Protocol, comprises the whole 
building housing the laboratory.
Freeport Cobalt Oy (MBA WKK0)
The by-products of Kokkola Chemicals facility’s cobalt purification process contain uranium, which 
qualifies these by-products as nuclear material. Kokkola Chemicals has an operating licence to produce, 
store and handle nuclear material. In 2013, Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. acquired the owner-
ship of the OM Group. The current operator is Freeport Cobalt Oy, and the facility is located at Kokkola 
on the west coast of Finland.
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy (MBA WNNH)
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy operates the nickel refining plant at Harjavalta in western Finland. The plant 
was commissioned in 1959, expanded in 1995 and again in 2002. The refinery of Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta 
employs the technique of the sulphuric acid leaching of nickel products. Uranium residuals are extracted 
from the nickel products, for example from the Talvivaara mine. In March 2010, STUK granted a licence 
to extract less than 10 tonnes of uranium per year. The Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta company submitted 
the basic technical characteristics (BTC) to the European Commission in December 2010. 
Terrafame Oy (MBA WTAL)
In 2010, the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd mining company announced its interest in investigating the recovery 
of uranium as a separate product from its sulphide ore body. The Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) 
were submitted to the European Commission in 2010, and the MBA code WTAL is assigned to the future 
uranium extraction plant that has been constructed as a separate part of the mineral processing plant. 
The production of uranium was expected to commence in 2013. However, Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd filed 
for bankruptcy in November 2014. During 2015 a new state-owned company, Terrafame, took over the 
mining operations at Talvivaara. At the end of 2016, the use of the uranium extraction plant was again 
included in the mining and mineral processing planning. STUK granted a licence for small-scale pilot 
testing of the mineral processing techniques in December 2017, but the use of the extraction plant needs 
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the operating licence to be granted by the Government. The application was submitted to the Govern-
ment at end of October 2017 and is currently being processed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment. The provision of the necessary information to STUK, required for a construction licence as 
per Nuclear Energy Decree 62a§, is under STUK assessment. Terrafame expects the construction licence 
to be granted in 2019, and operations will be launched after the granting of the non-appealability of 
the licences and permits. The MBA code WTAL is still being kept available for possible future nuclear 
activities.
Other nuclear material holders
There are about ten minor nuclear material holders in Finland. One of them is an actual material balance 
area: the University of Jyväskylä, Department of Physics ( JYFL, MBA code WDPJ), but in fact the nuclear 
material at JYFL has been derogated and exempted by the European Commission and the IAEA. Other 
minor nuclear material holders are members of a Catch-All-MBA (CAM), for the purposes of international 
nuclear safeguards. Most of these have depleted uranium as radiation-shielding material. 
Uranium may by concentrated in the mineral processing industry in intermediate or metal products 
with the uranium concentration that fulfils the definition of nuclear material. These metal products 
that are typical when, for example, processing sulphide ores with low uranium content, do not need 
to be included in the Euratom reporting because of their non-nuclear use. In the process industry, the 
annual quantities of processed natural uranium are in the order of several kilogrammes or even tonnes. 
Typically, uranium is extracted from the main products and considered as harmful waste among other 
extracts. According to the definitions in Finnish nuclear energy legislation, the production and possession 
of source material has been licensed by STUK since 2018 after the interpretation and decision of MEAE 
in summer 2018. Earlier, these kinds of stakeholders were not licensed by STUK, but a few gold compa-
nies, for example, have reported their uranium-rich gold production to STUK. Current licence holders 
are Boliden Kokkola Oy and Boliden Harjavalta Oy for the production and possession of uranium-rich 
copper cement originating from zinc concentrates.
Posiva (MBAs W0LE and W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It is owned by 
the nuclear power plant operators TVO and Fortum. Posiva has been excavating an underground rock 
characterisation facility called Onkalo at Eurajoki since 2004, and thus preparing for the construction 
of the disposal facility. In the IAEA safeguards approaches, it has been suggested that the geological 
formation should be under safeguards during the whole lifetime of the underground facility, beginning 
from the pre-operational phase. For this reason, Posiva was required to develop a non-proliferation 
handbook, such as a nuclear materials handbook, to describe its safeguards procedures and reporting 
system already before becoming a nuclear material holder. The licence to construct the disposal facility 
was granted by the Government in November 2015. Based on the drawings presented in the application, 
the preliminary BTCs were prepared for both facilities separately and submitted to the Commission in 
June 2013. The MBA codes assigned for the future facilities are W0LE for the encapsulation plant and 
W0LF for the geological repository. The installation without nuclear materials but with the two BTCs for 
these future Material Balance Areas constitutes a site according to the Additional Protocol. The Posiva 
site (SSFPOSI) covers the fenced area around the buildings supporting the construction of the facilities. 
Other stakeholders
Nuclear expert organisations, technology holders and suppliers that serve the nuclear and other in-
dustry are obliged to ensure that non-proliferation-sensitive technology does not get into the hands of 
unauthorised actors and thereby contribute to nuclear proliferation. The introduction of the Addition-
al Protocol extended the scope of safeguards to the non-proliferation control of nuclear programmes 
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and fuel cycle-related activities. These also include research and development activities not involving 
nuclear materials, but are related to the process or system development of fuel cycle aspects defined in 
the protocol. Additionally, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 requires every state to 
ensure that export controls, border controls, material accountancy and physical protection are efficiently 
addressed, and calls on all states to develop appropriate ways to work with and inform industry and the 
public of their obligations. The control of nuclear expert organisations to ensure the non-proliferation and 
peaceful use of sensitive technology and dual-use items is a growing global challenge for all stakeholders.
Nuclear safeguards are commonly seen as the traditional nuclear material accountancy and report-
ing system, the main stakeholders of which are the international, regional and local authorities and the 
operators. In accordance with the extended non-proliferation regime and the amendments to the Finnish 
legislation, the stakeholders, universities, research organisations or companies that have activities defined 
in the Additional Protocol are under reporting requirements and export control. These stakeholders (the 
Technical Research Centre and a few universities) as users of nuclear energy are required to prepare a 
nuclear safeguards manual and to nominate persons responsible for nuclear safeguards arrangements.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom Safeguards in Finland
The IAEA and the European Commission (Euratom safeguards) both have independent mandates to 
operate in Finland. These two international inspectorates have agreed on cooperation, which aims to 
reduce undue duplication of effort. The operators report to the Commission as required by Commission 
Safeguards regulation No 302/2005. It is the Commission’s task to control the licence holders’ account-
ing and reporting systems. The Commission must draw up the particular safeguard provisions (PSP) 
to agree on the means of safeguards implementation, taking account of the operational and technical 
constraints of the licence holder. 
The IAEA safeguards include traditional nuclear safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, and safeguards 
activities in accordance with the Additional Protocol, integrated together. While this should not lead 
to an increase in inspections, it should enable the IAEA to assure itself of the absence of undeclared 
nuclear activities in a state. In practice, the number of IAEA routine interim inspections is decreasing. 
In contrast to this, the IAEA additionally performs 1–3 short-notice inspections per year in a state that 
has a number and type of nuclear installations similar to the situation in Finland. The IAEA has annually 
drawn conclusions confirming its confidence that all nuclear activities and materials are accounted for 
and are in peaceful use in Finland.
The number of IAEA and Euratom routine inspections decreased significantly in 2009, as defined 
in the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which was negotiated during 2007 and 2008. At the 
trilateral meeting (IAEA/EC/STUK) in September 2013, it was agreed that no unannounced inspections 
with two hours’ notice time would be performed in Finland after the beginning of 2014. Thus, currently 
all short-notice inspections are expected to take place with 48 hours’ advance notice (see infobox). At 
reactors, the physical inventory verification includes both pre- and post-PIV inspections. In Loviisa, 
cask shipments are verified when the core is open. STUK continues with annual routines consisting 
of approximately 40 field inspections, which enables the effective safeguards implementation of the 
international inspectorates.
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, STUK must participate when the IAEA and Euratom 
are having inspections at Finnish facilities, so STUK has increased preparedness for short-notice and 
unannounced inspections and complementary access (abbreviated SNUICA). Every weekday, one of 
STUK’s inspectors is prepared to attend a possible IAEA or Euratom inspection. 
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials and activities are the basis for state evaluation by the 
IAEA under the obligations of the Additional Protocol. In Finland, the state has delegated its responsi-
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bility for these declarations to STUK. STUK has been nominated as a site representative, as per European 
Commission Regulation No. 302/2005. STUK collects, inspects and reviews the relevant information and 
then submits the compiled declarations in a timely fashion to the Commission and the IAEA.
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a state nuclear safeguards system to ensure that nuclear 
materials and activities within the state are in accordance with the licence holders’ declarations, and that 
there are no undeclared activities. Such methods can provide information on the identity of the nuclear 
materials and confirm that licence holders’ declarations are correct and complete with respect to, for 
example, the enrichment of uranium and the burn-up and cooling time of nuclear fuel. The technical 
analysis methods in use are non-destructive assay (NDA), environmental sampling and satellite imagery.
1.5 Control of uranium and thorium production
Mining and mineral processing operations aiming to produce uranium or thorium are also under regu-
latory control. In order to carry out these activities, a licence and accounting system to keep track of the 
amounts of uranium and thorium are required. A national licence is also required to export and import 
uranium or thorium ore and ore concentrates. These activities are also controlled by the Euratom Supply 
Agency and the European Commission. Mining and milling activities and the production of uranium 
and thorium must be reported to STUK, the Commission and the IAEA. 
1.6 Licensing and export/import control of dual-use goods
As per the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, other nuclear fuel cycle-related activities in addition to nuclear 
materials are under regulatory control. A licence is required for the possession, transfer and import of 
non-nuclear materials, components, equipment and technology suitable for producing nuclear energy 
(nuclear dual-use items). The list of these other items is based on the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) 
Guidelines (INFCIRC/254 Part 1). The licensing authority is STUK. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is 
responsible for granting NSG Government-to-Government Assurances (GTGA) when necessary. The min-
IAEA/EU regular inspections:
Facilities and spent fuel storages at nuclear power plants (NPPs):
• Physical Inventory Verification (PIV)/Design Information Verification (DIV) 1/year
• Random Interim Inspection (RII) at 48-h notification (at least 1/year for Finland)
Research reactor and locations outside facilities (LOF)
• PIV/DIV 1/4–6 years
New reactors, under construction
• DIV and PIV later, as at the NPPs
Repository under construction
• PIV/DIV most likely 1/year
Complementary access at 2/24-h notification to verify declared activities.
Euratom carries out additional inspections of the research reactor and MBas at locations outside 
facilities (LOFs)
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istry usually consults with STUK before giving the assurances. The licence holder is required to provide 
STUK with a list of the above-mentioned items annually. Moreover, the export, import and transfer of 
such items must be confirmed to STUK after the action.
Finland’s export control system is based on EU Council Regulation (EC) No. 428/2009 of 5 May 2009, 
which sets up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use 
items. This regulation was last amended in 2018. The export of Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) Part 1 and 
Part 2 items is regulated by the Finnish Act on the Control of Exports of Dual-use Goods. Authorisation 
is required to export dual-use items outside the European Union as well as for the EU internal transfers 
of NSG Part 1 items, excluding non-sensitive nuclear materials. The licensing authority is the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs. Before granting an export licence, it also takes care of NSG Government-to-Govern-
ment Assurances. The ministry asks STUK’s opinion on all applications concerning NSG Part 1 items.
1.7 Control of nuclear material transport
The requirements for the transport of radioactive material are set in the Finnish regulations on the 
transport of dangerous goods. The requirements are based on the IAEA Safety Standard Regulations for 
the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, SSR-6, and their purpose is to protect people, the environ-
ment and property from the harmful effects of radiation during the transport of radioactive material. 
Based on these regulations, STUK is the competent national authority for the regulatory control of the 
transport of radioactive material. 
In addition to the dangerous goods transport regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets spe-
cific requirements for the transport of nuclear material and nuclear waste. Generally, a licence granted 
by STUK is needed for such a transport. Usually the transport licences are granted for a fixed period, 
typically a few years. A transport plan and a transport security plan approved by STUK are mandatory for 
each consignment of nuclear material or nuclear waste. A certificate of nuclear liability insurance must 
also be delivered to STUK before transportation. Furthermore, a package may be used for the transport 
of fissile nuclear material only after the package design has been validated by STUK.
1.8 Nuclear safeguards and security strengthen each other
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory control of radiation and nuclear safety, security and 
safeguards (3S). All these three regimes have a common objective: the protection of people, society, the 
environment and future generations from the harmful effects of ionising radiation. As nuclear security 
aims to protect nuclear facilities’ sensitive or classified information, nuclear material and other radi-
oactive material from unlawful activities, it is clear that the majority of the activities that aim at the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and sensitive nuclear technology contribute 
to nuclear security. Physical and information security measures at nuclear facilities and for nuclear 
materials including technology, sensitive information and knowledge also contribute to non-prolifer-
ation by providing deterrence, detection and delay of and response to nuclear security events. On the 
other hand, nuclear material accountancy and detection measures may supplement security measures 
through a deterrence effect.
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2 Safeguards activities in 2018
2.1 The regulatory control of nuclear materials
In 2018, as in the past, STUK continued with national safeguards measures and activities with 59 in-
spection days and 40 inspections of material balance areas. The stakeholders’ activities were licensed 
and inspected as appropriate, and inventory reports and accountancies were verified systematically. The 
accumulation of nuclear material at the facilities is shown in Figures 3 and 4 and the verified nuclear 
material inventories at the end of 2018 are shown in Tables 2 and 3 in Appendix 1. 
The implementation of the IAEA’s integrated safeguards since 2008 reduces the total number of 
annual routine inspections days of the international inspectorates, but includes short-notice random 
inspections. Since 2010, the number of IAEA and European Commission inspections annually has been 
close to 20. The fluctuation is mainly due to the different design information verification activities at 
the disposal site during each of the years. In 2018, the IAEA launched more short-notice inspections in 
Finland than ever before, two short-notice random inspections (SNRI) in Loviisa, one in Olkiluoto, and 
one complementary access (CA) at VTT. The development of inspections and inspection person-days at 
material balance areas is presented in Figures 5 and 6. Inspections by STUK, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission in 2018 are presented in Appendix 2.
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The implementation of safeguards in Finland was addressed at several meetings with the IAEA and 
the European Commission. During the IAEA General Conference in September 2018, a trilateral meeting 
was organised in Vienna. A trilateral meeting at least once a year and usually supplemented by a smaller 
trilateral meeting in spring is a useful informal forum for every organisation to discuss, share informa-
tion and clarify state declarations. In addition, STUK experts met IAEA officials to discuss actual topics 
like implementing the State-Level Concept at Finnish facilities in connection with other meetings or 
occasions in Vienna. Similarly, in addition to the inspection routines, STUK continued with two annual 
safeguards meetings with each of the NPP operator’s staff members responsible for safeguards.
2.2 General safeguards activities
2.2.1 Additional Protocol declarations 
In 2018, STUK compiled licence holders’ reports using PR3 software provided by the IAEA for the first 
time, and submitted the annual updates for national declarations according to articles 2.a.(iii) and 
2.a.(viii) on 27 March 2018, and the declarations according to articles 2.a.(i), 2.a.(iv), 2.a.(x) and 2.b.(i) 
on 14 May 2018. Additionally, STUK submitted the quarterly declarations on exports in February, May, 
August and November.
2.2.2 Approvals of new international inspectors
In 2018, a total of 13 IAEA and 2 Commission inspectors, newly appointed, were approved to perform 
inspections at nuclear facilities in Finland. The acceptance of 20 IAEA inspectors was underway at the 
end of 2018.
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2.2.3 Nuclear dual-use items, export licences 
In 2018, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued 19 export licences for NSG Part 1 items: 
• 3 for equipment for nuclear power plant to France; 
• 9 for exporting nuclear technology (nuclear information) for a nuclear power plant to EU 
countries (Sweden, Germany, France, Spain, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Croatia), 2 to the 
Russian Federation and one to the USA; and 
• licences to export software and training to the Czech Republic (1), China (2) and Japan (1).
2.2.4 Transport of nuclear materials
In 2018, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to Finland from Germany, Sweden and the Russian Federation 
(Appendix 1, Table A1). In relation to these imports, STUK approved three transport plans and two 
transport packaging designs. STUK inspected fresh nuclear fuel consignments in accordance with the 
inspection plan with one inspection being carried out in 2018. Moreover, TVO imported and exported a 
few fresh fuel rods to and from and the fuel fabrication plant. In addition to fresh fuel consignments, a 
few spent fuel rods were shipped from Finland to Sweden for research purposes in 2018. The transport 
licence and transportation plan were approved by STUK. The transportation was inspected by STUK. 
VTT shipped nuclear material to be used in the research equipment of a department of nuclear physics 
at a university in the Czech Republic. A transport licence and plan were approved by STUK and the 
consignment was inspected.
2.2.5 International transfers of nuclear material
In 2018, TVO reported to STUK about its international fuel contracts, fuel transfers and fuel shipments. 
Based on the document inspection findings and audit of TVO’s international nuclear material transfer 
accountancy and control carried out on 10 January 2019, STUK concluded that TVO had complied with 
its safeguards obligations when purchasing the nuclear fuel and managing its international nuclear 
material transfers. Other operators purchase fuel as an end-product, so their accountancy does not need 
to cover the purchase chain abroad.
2.3 Safeguards implementation at the stakeholders
2.3.1 Loviisa nuclear power plant
In 2018, STUK granted three licences for the import of nuclear dual-use items. In early 2018, nuclear 
waste (five spent nuclear fuel rods) was also exported to Studsvik, Sweden for research purposes, and 
STUK granted a licence for this in 2017.
In total, STUK performed 10 safeguards inspections at the Loviisa NPP in 2018. A safeguards DIV 
inspection was carried out together with IAEA and the Commission on 21–22 February. A routine refuelling 
outage at the Loviisa 1 reactor unit took place during the period 22 September–18 October 2018 and the 
outage at the Loviisa 2 reactor unit during the period 5 August–21 September 2018. STUK, the IAEA and 
the Commission performed a Physical Inventory Taking (pre-PIT) inspection before the outages, on 18 
July 2018. This inspection was carried out effectively within one working day, as was proven to be good 
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practice the previous year. The Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) was carried out after the outage, on 
23–24 October 2018. STUK identified the fuel assemblies in the reactor cores and item-counted the fuel 
assemblies in the loading ponds. The Loviisa 2 core was inspected on 9 September 2018 and the Loviisa 
1 core on 1 October 2018. 
In December 2018, one random interim inspection was carried out by the IAEA and Commission 
together. Also, STUK performed its interim inspection at Loviisa NPP in December. This inspection 
focused on verifying the transport documentation of fresh nuclear fuel shipments.
On the basis of its own assessment, that of the IAEA and of the Commission inspection results, 
STUK concluded that Fortum’s Loviisa NPP complied with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2018.
2.3.2 Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
In 2018 STUK granted three import licences to TVO to import fresh nuclear fuel to the two operating 
units, 7 licences to import nuclear dual-use items and one for export of nuclear waste (four spent nuclear 
fuel rods) for research purposes to Studsvik, Sweden. TVO updated its nuclear materials handbook with 
the aim of improving the import control of dual-use items. The update was approved by STUK.
The operating reactor units Olkiluoto 1 and 2 and the spent fuel storage of the TVO Olkiluoto power 
plant were subject to 17 safeguards inspections. In addition, the accountancy of the uranium batches 
in TVO possession abroad was inspected. In cooperation with the European Commission and the IAEA, 
STUK performed the inspections that comprise the physical inventory verification of the reactor units 
and the spent fuel storage, both before and after the annual outages on 17–18 April and 3–4 July, respec-
tively. STUK performed the core verification inspection of both reactor units before the reactor core lid 
was closed.
STUK performed further two interim safeguards inspections in the reactor units and the spent fuel 
storage. STUK took part in the random interim inspection initiated by the IAEA at the Olkiluoto 2 unit 
together with the European Commission.
At the Olkiluoto 3 unit, the initial inventory verification inspection was carried out on 28 February 
by STUK together with the IAEA and the EC. The annual design information verification inspection at 
the Olkiluoto 3 unit was carried out by the IAEA, EC and STUK on 21 November. 
On the basis of its own assessment and that of the IAEA and of the Commission inspection results, 
STUK concluded that TVO’s Olkiluoto NPP complied with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2018.
2.3.2 The Hanhikivi nuclear power plant project
The Government granted a Decision-in-Principle in 2010 for the new operator Fennovoima to construct 
a new nuclear power plant at a new site. STUK initiated negotiations with the operators and the Com-
mission as well as with the IAEA in 2011 to prepare for the implementation of safeguards in good time 
simultaneously with the facility development. As a consequence, the company could request the vendor 
organisations to facilitate safeguards implementation, for example to improve proliferation resistance 
and facilitate nuclear material verification and surveillance at the future plant. In the meantime, Fen-
novoima created an organisation for safeguards and prepared for the implementation of safeguards. 
Applications for the position of responsible person for safeguards were submitted to STUK in autumn 
2018. The approval process has been delayed due changes in personnel at Fennovoima.
Based on the meetings on the implementation of safeguards and the control of nuclear technology 
with Fennovoima’s staff, STUK concludes that awareness and preparedness for safeguards procedures are 
at an adequate level in the new organisation preparing for the new NPP project and that Fennovoima 
fulfilled its current safeguards obligations in 2018.
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2.3.5 STUK
STUK’s Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section made a safeguards system inspection at STUK on 18 De-
cember 2018. STUK needs to update its nuclear material handbook and prepare a new BTC and site dec-
laration. New instructions are needed for sending, transporting and receiving nuclear material as well as 
for handling the security of nuclear material being used outside of STUK premises. It can be concluded 
that the operating unit at STUK fulfils the requirements for national safeguards arrangements. 
2.3.6 University of Helsinki
The premises of the laboratory of radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki were renovated in 2016 and 
the university structure was reorganised in 2017, but the stakeholder’s name and address – Department 
of Chemistry, University of Helsinki - in English have remained. STUK carried out safeguards inspection 
together with the European Commission on 7 June and verified the inventory. 
2.3.4 VTT
At the Technical Research of Finland (VTT), the 
preparations for licensing the decommissioning of 
the research reactor and associated activities con-
tinued together with the initiation of new research 
activities at the Centre for Nuclear Safety where 
operations started in 2017 by moving the small 
amounts of nuclear material used in the laborato-
ries located in the reactor building. Both buildings 
with separate material balance areas (MBA) were 
included in the updated site declaration in 2017. 
The BTC of the Centre for Nuclear Safety was up-
dated in January 2018 as requested during the No-
vember 2017 inspection. The IAEA and the Com-
mission carried Complementary Access to the site 
on 10 April and collected environmental samples 
in the old laboratories of the research reactor build-
ing (Figure 7). The old uranium fuel was shipped 
abroad in June 2018. STUK verified the fuel prior to 
the shipment on 30 May 2018.
STUK and the Commission verified the nucle-
ar material inventories of both of VTT’s MBAs on 
5 and 6 June 2018. At the end of the year, VTT was 
asked to clarify the historical usage of the labora-
tories to respond to the findings in the samples 
collected during the Complementary Access. VTT 
submitted its clarification to STUK in December, 
which was evaluated and submitted in January 2019 
to the EC and the IAEA.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that VTT complied with 
its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2018.
FIGURE 7. IaEa inspector carrying out environmental 
sampling in the old laboratories under decommissioning 
(picture by. I. auterinen, VTT).
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On the basis of its assessment and inspection results, STUK concluded that the University of Hel-
sinki complied with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2018.
2.3.7 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2018, STUK inspected the reports from the minor nuclear material holders. The minor holders were 
requested to prepare their nuclear materials handbooks as required in the new STUK requirements, i.e. 
in YVL Guide D.1. In total, 3 handbooks prepared by the minor holders were approved in 2018.
On the basis of its assessment, STUK concluded that the minor nuclear material holders complied 
with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 2018.
2.3.8 Front-end fuel cycle operators
The operators at Harjavalta and Kokkola report monthly to the Commission and STUK. The extraction 
of uranium from industrial purification processes is considered to be a pre-safeguard activity and there-
fore not subject to IAEA safeguards. In 2016, STUK and the Commission inspected the inventories and 
accountancy practices at both of the operators. During 2017 and 2018, no new uranium extraction took 
place so no site inspections were carried out. The operators reported about their planned activities and 
monthly inventories according to safeguards requirements. On the basis of its assessment, STUK con-
cluded that these operators complied with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 2018.
In early 2011, STUK evaluated the licence application of Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd to begin uranium 
production as a by-product at the Talvivaara nickel mine. During 2011–2013, the uranium extraction plant 
was built as a new unit in the mineral processing complex, but progress was halted for economic and 
environmental reasons. In June 2017, the new operator Terrafame Ltd applied for an operating licence 
to carry out pilot tests to analyse the processing techniques to be applied in the uranium extraction 
plant. The pilot tests were licensed by STUK just as for other minor holders possessing small amounts of 
natural uranium in December 2017. The nuclear safeguards manual and responsible persons for nuclear 
materials accountancy were therefore approved by STUK before granting the licence. The licence appli-
cation for the operation of the uranium extraction plan was submitted to the Government in October 
2017. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment launched the process to evaluate the applica-
tion within the desired timeline in June 2018. Within this process, STUK’s Safeguards Section approved 
Terrafame’s ‘Plan for arranging the safeguards control that is necessary to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons’ that was submitted according to the Nuclear Energy Decree for STUK’s approval. By the 
end, the STUK was assessing the rest of the documentation, such as the preliminary safety assessment 
reports. In addition, the proposed update of Terrafame’s safeguards manual was postponed to include 
the foreseen needs from the IAEA and Commission. The manual must be updated before the extraction 
operations begin. During 2018, the first pilot test was carried out. The uranium remained in liquid form, 
but reached the grade of source material. The drainage of the materials will be tested after the licensing.
2.3.9 The disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel
The operator Posiva applied for the nuclear construction licence for the disposal facility in 2012. STUK 
assessed the application during 2013–2015 together with the Commission and the IAEA in order to clarify 
and facilitate safeguards measures for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The requirement doc-
ument for the IAEA/EC equipment to be installed in the encapsulation plant was prepared and finalised 
in 2014. This requirement document was referenced in the STUK assessment of the licence application. 
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In 2017, Posiva updated the BTCs both for the encapsulation plant and the geological repository. In 
particular, the layout of the encapsulation plant was updated in May 2017. As a consequence, the require-
ment document for the safeguards equipment to be installed at the encapsulation plant was updated 
by the IAEA and the Commission in December 2018. The changes in the layout and their influence on 
the equipment selection were discussed jointly at several meetings. This ‘Safeguards-by-Design’ process 
can be expected to continue during the progress of the facility. 
The underground construction for technical servicing parts such as parking halls, personnel shafts, 
etc. continued during 2018, but the construction of nuclear parts where nuclear material will be stored 
or transferred in the installation was also begun by excavating an access tunnel to the canister shaft, 
canister transfer tunnels, canister storage, etc. There were more than 10 active concurrent construction 
locations underground. At ground level, the foundation work for the encapsulation plant continued. 
These were inspected during the weekly inspections of STUK’s resident inspector.
In 2018, STUK carried out two interim safeguards inspections at the site. On the basis of its as-
sessment and inspection results, STUK concluded that Posiva complied with its nuclear safeguards 
obligations in 2018.
2.3.10 Other stakeholders
Research organisations and universities provided STUK with their annual declarations on research and 
development work. After its review, STUK prepared the annual declaration based on the Additional 
Protocol to the IAEA within the time limit of 15 May.
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3 Development work in 2018
3.1 Development of working practices 
STUK started a new strategy period in 2018. The new strategy aims at a change. The change involves 
the entire philosophy. In the new strategy period 2018–2022, the activities of STUK will be guided by 
effectiveness. Methods for achieving effectiveness, include risk-oriented commensurable oversight and 
flexible and efficient working methods. Increased emphasis on operators’ responsibility forms the basis 
of this strategy. To meet the objectives of the new strategy, STUK needs to invest in the competence 
and well-being of its personnel. In the nuclear safeguards section, these have been taken into account, 
for example in developing job rotation inside the section, encouraging pair- and teamwork, seeking 
opportunities in training and competence building and in sharing knowledge. Part of this approach is 
a contribution to the international multidisciplinary tasks supporting safeguards, safety and security.
The change in oversight and increased emphasis on operators’ responsibility aim for increased 
trust and a culture in which operators accept the responsibility for safety, and find and propose viable 
solutions for ensuring and improving safety. Another objective is to have a critical look at STUK’s re-
quirements for operators. With regard to safeguards, STUK’s regulatory guide D.1 for nuclear material 
holders and other stakeholders was updated in 2018 to highlight the responsibilities of operators to 
better meet these strategic objectives.
Nuclear materials safeguards implemented by the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section of STUK 
cover all typical measures of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), 
and many other activities besides. Nuclear safeguards on the national level are closely linked with the 
other functions of nuclear materials control and non-proliferation: licensing, export control, border 
control, transport control, combating illicit trafficking, the physical protection of nuclear materials, 
and monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The continuous 
analysis of the developments in the involved fields of both technology and politics is a daily, multidis-
ciplinary task in the STUK Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section.
In 2018, the number of staff member in the Nuclear Material Safeguards Section was six inspectors, 
an assistant and section head. An employee working on his thesis was also recruited to contribute to the 
development of the spent nuclear fuel measurement method. During the year, new working practices 
were adopted. New inspectors attended the national course on nuclear safety and Euratom nuclear 
safeguards course given by the Commission in Luxembourg.
During 2018, STUK carried out preparatory work for the submission of digital declarations using 
Protocol Reporter 3 software. Like many internal development projects, this was partly carried out as a 
support programme for the IAEA. A workshop was held in January 2017 in Helsinki together with Loviisa 
plant staff who prepared the test package in March. The IAEA tested and evaluated the digital declaration 
site maps for their compatibility to the IAEA system.
As the licensed construction of the disposal facility began in 2016, the preparatory work at the 
authority focused on timely implementation of safeguards, in particular the equipment infrastructure 
to be fitted to the encapsulation and disposal process. The development of passive gamma emission 
tomography continued in cooperation with national experts at the Helsinki Institute of Physics and also 
within the support programme to the IAEA. In addition, the geoscientific monitoring programme was 
updated for its safety relevance, and its applicability to STUK safeguards was reassessed.
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In Finland, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
(MEAE) have a role in safeguards. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for the international 
aspects of Finland’s non-proliferation policy in collaboration with other authorities. The export con-
trol of nuclear products also falls within the ambit of the MFA. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE) is responsible for the supreme command and control of nuclear matters. During 
2018, STUK together with ministries strengthened cooperation in the area of non-proliferation, export 
control and disarmament. As a new joint activity, STUK experts participate in Nuclear Suppliers’ Group’s 
Technical Expert Group meetings.
3.2 Support programme to the IAEA safeguards
The Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) is financed by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs and coordinated by STUK. The FINSP was established in May 1988. In 2018, FINSP was active in 
the areas of verification method development, the development of safeguards guidance for the IAEA 
Member States and in inspector training. All active tasks at the end of 2018 are listed in Table 2. Some 
highlights of the 2018 activities are provided in the following text.
Task Description
TRAINING
B 1949 Specialized Training and Visits to Nuclear Facilities (J.M. Crété, PM, F. Maluta, TO) 
B 1435 Spent Fuel Verification Training Course (J.M. Crété, PM, D. Lacey, TO) 
B 1939 Support for Newcomer States Pursuing a Nuclear Power Programme (J.M. Crété, PM &TO) 
CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES
C 2307 Support for the 2018 Safeguards Symposium (E. Pujol, PM, C. Mathews, TO)
C 2290 Update of the Physical Model (J. Doo, PM, B. Boyer, TO)
C 2399
Umbrella Task – Technical assistance on Methodology and Guidance for Implementation of Safeguards at 
the State level (J. Doo, PM, R. Hernon, Req.) 
JNT C 1611
application of Safeguards to Geological Repositories (aSTOR) “Group of Experts” (BEL, CaN, CZ, EC, ESP, 
FIN, FRa, GER, HUN, JPN, NET, ROK, RSa, SWE, USa (J. Doo, PM, M. Davainis, TO)
JNT C 2383
Consolidation of SaGOR and aSTOR Tasks Recommendations  
(J. Doo PM, M. Davainis TO)
TECHNICAL & SCIENTIFIC SERVICES
a 1628 MSSP Umbrella Task: Support for Instrumentation Technology Foresight (D. Finker, PM, a. Sokolov, TO) 
a 2390
Field-testing of an Unmanned Surface Vehicle and Next Generation Cerenkov Viewing Device  
(D. Finker, PM & Req.)
JNT a 2258 
FIN
Performance Evaluation and Implementation Support of Gamma Emission Tomography for Spent-Fuel 
Verification (M. Mayorov, PM, T. White, TO) 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
D 1996
Digital Declaration Site Maps (DDSM)  
(M. Carey, PM, a. Keskinen, TO) 
D 2330
Creation of E-learning Modules, Supporting the Preparation of State Declared Information  
(S. Konecni, PM, W. Mandl, TO) 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SERVICES
JNT D 2284
Developing business capabilities for the Modernization of Safeguards Information Technology (MOSaIC)  
(G. Whitaker, PM & TO) 
 
TABLE 2. active FINSP tasks as of 31 December 2018.
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NDA training courses for IAEA inspectors
As in previous years, FINSP organised NDA training for the IAEA inspectors in 2018. Two Spent Fuel 
Verification Training Courses were held at the Loviisa NPP from 20–29 November 2018, with the coop-
eration of the NPP operator Fortum.
Disposal programmes for spent nuclear fuel and the ASTOR group
The programmes for a geological repository for spent nuclear fuel in Sweden and Finland have reached 
the licensing phase, and the safeguards measures must be agreed on by all parties: facility designers, 
operators and the inspectorates. The implementation of safeguards measures has been discussed in 
several fora. The Experts’ Group Application of Safeguards to Geological Repositories (ASTOR) provided 
the IAEA with its draft report mainly on potential methods that can be applied to safeguard geologi-
cal repositories. The report (STR-384) was published by the IAEA in August 2017. This task of SAGOR/
ASTOR, which had been in effect for more than 20 years, was formally closed after the report. However, 
the IAEA created a new task to consolidate the earlier reports and findings of the Experts’ Group, so 
this task is still ongoing. Unfortunately, the Group is too slow and bureaucratic to assist in the practi-
cal implementation of safeguards within the timelines for the construction of the disposal facility in 
Olkiluoto. In addition, the scopes of the ASTOR and EPGR groups established by IAEA Operations in 
2012 to support safeguards to the Encapsulation Plant and Geological Repository (EPGR) are so different 
that they do not support each other.
Interregional Training Course on the Implementation of National Requirements for Nuclear 
Power Programmes
Many Member States of the IAEA plan to add nuclear to their energy mix. Those ‘newcomer’ states 
receive support from the IAEA in implementing an efficient and effective regulatory system. One type 
of support is the provision of training courses in cooperation with countries with established nuclear 
power programmes. Well-established processes with the nuclear operators and regulators in the Member 
States and well-functioning SSACs will help the IAEA in safeguards implementation. FINSP has been 
supporting the IAEA in organising these courses since 2014. In 2018, the course was held in Helsinki and 
in Olkiluoto from 20–24 August 2018.
FIGURE 8. Interregional Training course visiting Olkiluoto NPP. Participants were from UaE,  
Belarus, Egypt, Jordan, Bangladesh, Saudi arabia, Turkey and Poland.
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Field-testing of an Unmanned Surface Vehicle and NeXt Generation Cerenkov Viewing Device
FINSP organised the first field test of floating robots at Loviisa NPP in November 2018 (see Figure 9). 
Altogether 3 different floating robots were tested in real NPP conditions. The payload of the robots was 
the newly developed XCVD (neXt-generation Cherenkov Viewing Device) camera. The robots were able 
to autonomously and systematically navigate on the pool surface while XCVD collected visual data in 
ultraviolet region for later review. The tests were a good experience and provided insight into what needs 
to be taken into account before the systems can be introduced into operational use.
FIGURE 9. IaEa staff members setting up a floating robot for a test run at Loviisa  
NPP with the assistance of STUK.
3.3 International cooperation and services
The state’s regulatory authority plays an important role in implementing safeguards at a national level, 
and also in contributing to and participating in the international fora to share experiences and interact 
with other parties. Participating in international events with a suitable contribution is also the best 
training for safeguards inspectors. Resources are limited, so the selection of the events is important.
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STUK is a member of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) 
and has appointed Finnish experts to its committees and most of the working groups. STUK participates 
in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings and in several working groups. A STUK expert continued 
with the chairmanship of the Verification Technologies and Methodologies (VTM) Working Group until 
summer 2018 when the chairmanship was handed over to the vice chair. Several joint Working Group 
meetings were arranged on safeguards issues concerning the disposal of spent fuel, and a special issue 
of ESARDA Bulletin 56 was compiled based on the presentations. Two STUK experts participated in the 
ESARDA Reflection Group that is reviewing the ESARDA administrative practices and formulating new 
short- and long-term strategies for ESARDA. These will be presented at the ESARDA 50th Anniversary 
Symposium in May 2019.
STUK experts also made a few presentations and other contributions at the Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management (INMM) annual meeting in Baltimore, M.D., USA.
The IAEA organised the ‘Symposium on International Safeguards: Building Future Safeguards 
Capabilities’ in November in Vienna. The symposium is held every fourth year, and almost 900 experts 
from more than 100 different countries participated. STUK and Finnish stakeholders held presentations 
at the symposium.
In 2014, the partnership programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy 
(K.A.CARE), the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK was launched. The initiative is to give expert sup-
port to the establishment of a nuclear regulatory authority in Saudi Arabia. In the field of safeguards 
and nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and security experts carry out practical cooperation with their 
colleagues at K.A.CARE. 
In 2016, two EU-funded projects were launched to support the nuclear regulators in Vietnam and 
Tanzania as these countries are aiming at nuclear power and uranium mining, respectively. The kick-off 
meetings were held in 2016 and the cooperation is scheduled to continue for at least 2–3 years. STUK 
contributed to a new EU-funded project that covers the security and border control of radioactive and 
nuclear materials in several African countries.
The Stimson Center is an independent research centre that does safeguards research, among other 
things. In October, the Stimson Center together with INMM experts organised a visit to Finland with 
the aim of familiarising themselves with the safeguards of spent fuel disposal (travel report: https://
spark.adobe.com/page/EBeJpHF8lNm92/). STUK, in cooperation with Posiva, hosted the visit, and the 
ministries and the municipality of Eurajoki facilitated the visit. A similar visit to Finland for familiar-
isation with spent fuel disposal was arranged for a Japanese delegation in December. There are new 
kinds of challenges concerning the long-term security and safeguards of the disposal facility that were 
addressed during the visits.
3.4 Spent fuel disposal and Gosser R&D project
The disposal of spent fuel requires that safety, data security and other security arrangements and the 
safeguards required to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be properly implemented at a 
national level. For this purpose, STUK launched GOSSER (Geological Disposal Safeguards and Security) 
to finalise the Finnish concept for safeguarding the geological disposal of spent nuclear fuel in 2016. 
The first project period ended in 2018 and final report was prepared to describe the national safeguards 
concept for spent fuel disposal in Finland.
According to the national safeguards concept prepared, it is proposed that all the fuel be verified in 
a comprehensive manner and with the available system comprising a PGET and PNAR (Passive Neutron 
Albedo Reactivity) verifier. The NDA system should be an instrument in joint use between the IAEA, 
EC and STUK. On the other hand, on the C/S-side STUK can rely on technical surveillance and the con-
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clusions of the international inspectorates. STUK can also make use of the information collected by its 
resident inspectors, inspection programme and environmental monitoring networks.
International inspectors do not plan to routinely follow nuclear material at the disposal depth. 
STUK has a different position here. In terms of safety, security and safeguards (3S), STUK will check 
that Posiva performs underground activities according to approved plans and STUK will utilise the same 
inspection effort to collect relevant information for all 3Ss. Examples of information most relevant to 
safeguards are data proving that the canisters are placed in the correct positions as declared to STUK 
and data showing that backfilling and sealing have been done in the approved manner. How this is 
efficiently and effectively arranged needs to be discussed in detail nationally.
The GOSSER project will now continue to the second phase. The programme is planned for the 
period 2019–2022. The plan is now going into greater details and includes the development of technol-
ogies and refining the national safeguards approach. 
3.4 GICNT– Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
Nuclear Security activities often include cooperation between multiple authorities. Nuclear Security 
also has a strong international linkage. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, GICNT, 
established in 2006, is one of the most important international fora for nuclear security. Currently 88 
states and six international organisations participate the work of GICNT. Member states’ nuclear security 
capabilities and cooperation are developed, for example, by organising exercises. The Finnish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs is coordinating the work of GICNT until the summer of 2019 and STUK serves as the 
Ministry’s technical advisor.
3.5 IPNDV– International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament 
Verification
The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) was established on the 
initiative of the United States in 2014. The IPNDV develops methods and procedures for the verification 
of nuclear disarmament. The second two-year phase of IPNDV started at the beginning of 2018. In the 
second phase, the scope is being expanded to cover all steps of nuclear disarmament, i.e., unlike phase 
one it not only concentrates on the verification of dismantlement of a nuclear weapon. During the second 
phase, the work becomes more concrete through various exercises and technology demonstrations. The 
IPNDV is a US initiative and the other participants come from both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon 
states. Finland has been participating in the IPNDV from the beginning. STUK’s tasks in IPNDV have 
always been connected to the development of technological verification methods.
3.6 NSG – Nuclear Suppliers Group
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a multilateral export control regime and a group of nuclear supplier 
countries that seek to prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling the export of materials, equipment 
and technology that can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. It has 48 participating governments. 
Finland is represented by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the NSG forum. As a consequence of the 
strengthened national cooperation, STUK’s experts attended the NSG Technical Expert Group meetings 
in 2018.
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3.7 NPT Preparatory Committee
The Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970. The NPT Treaty includes some 190 countries 
around the world. The Treaty Review Conference is held every five years – the previous one in 2015 
and the next in 2020. Before the Review Conference, preparatory meetings will be held. STUK’s expert, 
together with Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, Ministry of 
Defence and other organisations, attended a preparatory meeting in May in Geneva.
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4 National Data Centre for the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (FiNDC)
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is an important part of the international regime 
for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The CTBT bans any nuclear test explosions in any environ-
ment. This ban is aimed at constraining the development and the qualitative improvement of nuclear 
weapons, including the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and was opened for signature in 
New York on 24 September 1996. It will enter into force after it has been ratified by the 44 states listed 
in its Annex 2. These 44 states participated in the 1996 session of the Conference on Disarmament and 
possess nuclear power or research reactors. 
A global verification regime is being established in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. 
The verification regime consists of the following elements: the International Monitoring System (IMS), 
a consultation and clarification process, on-site inspections and confidence-building measures. The IMS 
is almost 90% ready and is providing data from more than 300 measuring stations all over the world to 
more than 1,200 organisations in more than 120 countries. In addition to monitoring compliance with the 
treaty, the data from the IMS is used in disaster mitigation. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO) actively provides data to the global Tsunami Warning System and, since 2012, the 
CTBTO has been a member of the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies 
(IACRNE) and a co-sponsor of the Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International 
Organisations ( JPLAN) led by the IAEA. Within this framework, the CTBTO is responsible for gather-
ing and providing close to real-time radionuclide monitoring data to the IAEA and other participating 
organisations. 
Finland signed the CTBT on its inaugural day in 1996 and ratified it less than three years later. In 
addition to complying with the basic requirement of the CTBT of not carrying out any nuclear weapons 
tests, Finland actively takes part in the development of the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the Finnish national authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK 
has two roles: it operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the 16 radionuclide lab-
oratories in the IMS (RL07). The most important task of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from IMS 
and inform the national authority about any indications of a nuclear test explosion. The radionuclide 
laboratory contributes to the IMS by providing support in radionuclide analyses and in quality control 
of the radionuclide station network. The third major national collaborator is the Institute of Seismology 
at the University of Helsinki, which runs an IMS seismology station (PS17 in Lahti) and provides analysis 
of waveform IMS data.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) Status (31 December 2018)
• CTBT Member States 184
• Total Ratifications 167
• annex 2 Ratifications 36
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4.1 International cooperation the foundation of CTBT verification
In 2018, the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) participated in workshops and meetings of the Work-
ing Group B (WGB) of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO). WGB is a policy-making organ for the technical development of the verification 
regime. By participating in the work of WGB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert groups), the 
FiNDC can provide technical expertise to the CTBTO, while also attending to Finnish national interests. 
4.2 The analysis pipeline a well-established daily routine
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide measurement data generated at IMS radionuclide stations 
across the world. The analysis pipeline is linked to the LINSSI database and equipped with an automated 
alarm system to enable efficient and fully automated screening of the data. The IMS network is still 
being developed and the number of installed and certified air filter stations was 70 at the end of 2018 
(in the final stage there will be 80).
The number of IMS stations equipped with radioxenon measurement capabilities was 31 at the 
end of 2018. Twenty-five systems were certified. Radioxenon measurements are especially important for 
CTBT verification because xenon, as a noble gas, may also leak from underground tests, which seldom 
release particulate matter. The operational stations generated more than 1,000 gamma and beta-gamma 
spectra per day for the FiNDC analysis pipeline to handle. The pipeline is well-established and has been 
running stably for many years. 
Xenon radioisotopes released from medical isotope production facilities and NPPs are regularly 
measured all around the globe. Anthropogenic nuclides with CTBT relevance, mainly 99Tc, 131I from 
medical isotope production and 137Cs from Chernobyl and Fukushima fallout are regularly measured at 
some particulate stations. In 2018, no activities pointing to clandestine nuclear testing were detected 
by the network.
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5 Summary
STUK continued with national safeguards measures and activities with 59 inspection days and 40 in-
spections. Since 2010, the number of annual IAEA and European Commission inspections has been 
around 20. The implementation of the IAEA integrated safeguards since 2008 in force in Finland reduces 
the total number of annual routine inspections days of the international inspectorates but includes 
short-notice random inspections. In order to be present at all the short-notice IAEA inspections, STUK 
has had a daily on-call inspector. 
In 2018, STUK performed 29 safeguards inspections on the material balance areas of the Finnish 
nuclear power plants (NPP), 10 at Loviisa NPP and 19 at Olkiluoto NPP. According to the IAEA state-level 
approach for Finland, three short-notice random inspections were carried out, two at Loviisa NPP and 
one at Olkiluoto unit 2, and one complementary access to the VTT site. This was the highest number of 
IAEA short-notice activities in Finland this far. STUK performed one non-destructive assay measurement 
campaign at both NPPs. These, in particular the passive gamma emission tomography (PGET) tests, 
were followed and performed by the IAEA and Commission staff members, increasing the number of 
inspection days. At other facilities, the Commission took part in accountancy inspection and physical 
inventory verifications at the VTT Research Reactor and Centre for Nuclear Safety and at University 
of Helsinki. As the old fuel was exported following the decommissioning of the VTT Research Reactor, 
STUK verified the fuel for last time before the shipment. The total number of safeguards inspections 
in 2018 was 40 for STUK, 24 for the Commission, and 20 for the IAEA. The IAEA sent its safeguards 
statements to the Commission, which amended them with its own conclusions and forwarded them to 
STUK. The conclusions by the Commission were in line with the IAEA’s remarks as well as with STUK’s 
own findings; there were no outstanding questions by the IAEA or the Commission at the end of 2018, 
which could not be answered and clarified.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards inspection activities continued to demonstrate that the 
Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of unde-
clared materials or activities, and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the 
stakeholders’ declarations. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks, nor did they present 
any required actions based on their inspections. By means of their nuclear materials accountancy and 
control systems, the stakeholders enabled Finland to fulfil its own obligations under the international 
agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. 
Among the major achievements in 2018 were the preparation of a national safeguards concept for 
spent fuel disposal within the GOSSER project. The GOSSER II project plan has been prepared for the 
period 2019–2022. The goal creates a more refined safeguards approach and further develops necessary 
technologies. During the achievement of the GOSSER I phase, results were demonstrated and published 
on several fora. 
In 2018, STUK’s Nuclear Materials Safeguards Section cooperated closely with the IAEA to share 
experiences and train authorities’ staff in countries aiming at nuclear programmes, i.e. uranium pro-
duction or nuclear energy. This context was enlarged to Tanzania and Vietnam in EU-financed projects. 
The cooperation with Saudi Arabia continued in 2018. 
A major goal of all current Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)-related activities is the 
entry into force of the CTBT itself. To reach this goal, major steps must be taken in the political arena, 
and an important prerequisite for positive political action is for the verification system of the CTBTO 
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to be functioning and able to assure all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear test 
without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour so that the veri-
fication system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task. While still incomplete, the verification 
system has clearly demonstrated its ability to detect nuclear tests.
The outcome of the supervision and activities carried out in 2018 is that implementation of nuclear 
non-proliferation in Finland has achieved its objectives.
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7 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement concerning the 
International Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the Safeguards 
Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions Group of the Council of 
the European Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to Geological 
Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear (such as in ‘protective measures 
taken against CBRN weapons or hazards’)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization
DIQ
Design Information Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
Enhanced FORK with a CdZnTe-gamma 
spectrometer (see FORK)
EPGR
Encapsulation Plant and Geological 
Repository
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards Research and 
Development Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment according to the 
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193), (2) 
Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA 
Safeguards
44 STUK-B 233 / May 2019
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with gross gamma and 
neutron detection
GBUV
Gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
Global Initiative for Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
High-enriched uranium, 20% or more of 
U-235
HPGe
High-Purity Germanium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
IMS
International Monitoring System of the 
CTBTO
ITU
Institute of Transuranium Elements in 
Karlsruhe
INFCIRC
Information Circular (IAEA document type, 
e.g. INFCIRC/193, Safeguards Agreement, or 
INFCIRC/140, the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
INMM
Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 
IPNDV
International Partnership for Nuclear 
Disarmament Verification
IPPAS
International Physical Protection Advisory 
Service
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory Service
ITWG
International Technical Working Group for 
combating illicit trafficking of nuclear and 
other radioactive materials
JRC
The Joint Research Centre
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LEU
Low-enriched uranium, less than 20 % of 
U-235
LINSSI
An SQL database for gamma-ray 
spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEAE
Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment 
MFA
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/140, “Non-
Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
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NRC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OECD/NEA
Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development /Nuclear Energy Agency
Onkalo
Underground rock characterisation facility 
(for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel)
PGET
Passive Gamma Emission Tomography
PIT
Physical Inventory Taking
PIV
Physical Inventory Verification
PNAR
Passive Neutron Albedo Reactivity
PSP
Particular Safeguards Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory in the CTBT IMS 
network hosted by STUK (FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SNRI
Short Notice Random Inspection
SNUICA
Short notice, unannounced inspection, 
complementary access, on-call inspector
SSAC
State System of Accounting for and Control 
of Nuclear Materials
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority
Th
Thorium
U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
UNSC
United Nations Security Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of Finland
WGB
Working Group B (of the CTBTO)
YVL Guide
Regulatory Guide on Nuclear Safety (STUK 
requirements on safety, security and 
safeguards, in Finnish Ydinvoimalaitosohje)
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APPENDIX 1 
Nuclear materials in Finland 2018
TABLE A1. Summary of fresh nuclear fuel receipts in 2018.
To From FA LEU (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 Germany 110 19 408
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 Sweden 100 17 536
Olkiluoto 3, W0L3 Germany 49 26 086
Loviisa NPP, WL0V Russian Federation 156 19 588
Fa = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium.
TABLE A2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2018
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 1 182/600 201387 966
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 1 310/736 219 734 1 144
Olkiluoto 3, W0L3 245/0 130 784 0
Olkiluoto, spent fuel storage, 
W0LS
7786/7786 1 311 612 11174
Loviisa NPP, WL0V 6303/5533 734 110 6 996
MBa = material balance area, Fa = fuel assembly, SFa = spent fuel assembly
*) Fuel assemblies (Fa) in the core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa NPP 313 Fas and Olkiluoto NPP 500 Fas per reactor in units 1 and 2)
TABLE A3. Total amounts of nuclear materials at 31 December 2018
MBA Natural U (kg) Enriched U* (kg) Depleted U (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
W0L1 – 201 387 – 966 –
W0L2 – 219 734 – 1144 –
W0L3 – 130 784 10.5 – –
W0LS – 1 311 612 – 11 174 –
WL0V – 715 799 – 6 755 –
WRRF 92.751 27.637 0.001 < 0.001 –
WNSC 0.282 2.220 – – 0.044
WHEL 10.837 0.295 0.005 0.002 1.079
WFRS 46.67 0.537 195.7 <0.001 2.370
WTAL 1.358 – – – –
WKK0 2 709.700 – – – –
WNNH 3 588.070 – – – –
Minor holders 0.986 0.0011 903.6 0 0.249
MBa = material balance area, WRRF = VTT  Research Reactor, WNSC = VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, WHEL = University of 
Helsinki, WFRS = STUK, WTaL = Terrafame Oy, in Sotkamo, WKK0 = Freeport Cobalt Oy, in Kokkola, WNNH = Norilsk Nickel 
Harjavalta, U = uranium. *) Less than 150 g of high-enriched uranium, mainly used in detectors.
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APPENDIX 2 
Safeguards field activities in 2018
Inspections Inspection person days
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
WL0V 22–23 Jan SNF transport     1     4
S SF POSI 1 Feb Site     1     2
S SF OLK1 13 Feb Site     1     1
W0L3 28 Feb PIV (initial inventory) 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 9 Nov NDa/PGET 1 1 1 6 3 4
S SF VTTI 10 apr Ca 1 1 1 2 1 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 17–18 apr Pre-PIT PIV 3 3 3 2 2 2
W0L2 2 May Core Verification     1     1
WL0V 31 May SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
WRRF 31 May NM Export     1     1
WNSC 5 Jun PIV, DIV   2 2   1 2
WRRF 6 Jun PIV, DIV   2 2   1 2
WHEL 7 Jun PIV, site   2 2   1 2
W0L1 13 Jun Core Verification     1     1
W0L1, W0L2,W0LS 3 apr Post-PIT PIV 3 3 3 2 2 2
WL0V 18 Jul Pre-PIT PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 6 aug Field activities 1     1    
W0L2 14 aug Post-PIT PIV Follow-up 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 10 Sep LO2 Core Verification     1     1
WL0V 1 Oct LO1 Core Verificaltion     1     1
TVO 2–4 Oct System Inspection (KTO)     1     9
WL0V 23–24 Oct Post-PIT DIV 1 1 1 2 2 2
Posiva 15–16 Nov System Inspection (RTO)     1     6
W0L2 20 Nov SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L3, W0LS 21–22 Nov PIV, DIV W0L3;
Seal check W0LS
3 3 3 2 2 1
W0L1 (W0L2, W0LS) 20 & 22 Nov Interim Inspection     1     1
WL0V 28 Nov Field activities 1   1 1   1
W0LE, W0LF 29 Nov DIV     2     2
WL0V 17 Nov SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 18 Dec Interim Inspection     1     2
WFRS 18 Dec System Inspection     1     2
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APPENDIX 3 
International agreements relevant to 
nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements concerning safeguards of nuclear materials and other nuclear 
items in Finland (Finnish Treaty Series, FTS):
Treaties and international organisations in which Finland is a party
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; adopted in London, Moscow and Washington on 
1 July 1968 (1970), INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 March 1957:
• Regulation No 5, amendment of the list in Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
• Regulation No 9, article 197, point 4 of the Euratom Treaty, on determining concentrations of 
ores, 2 February 1960.
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (FTS 15/2001). This Treaty was ratified by Finland on January 
15, 1999 but will not enter into force before it is ratified by all 44 states listed in Annex II of the Treaty.
• International Atomic Energy Agency (since 1958).
• Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (since 1976).
• International Energy Agency (since 1992). 
Safeguards Agreements based on Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation 
of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 Sep-
tember 1973. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
The Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ireland, the Italian 
Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the Portuguese Republic, the 
Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Prolifer-
ation of Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered into force on 30 April 2004.
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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS IN FINLAND APPENDIX 3
Finland is a party to the following international conventions among others (the year when the 
convention entered into force for Finland is given in brackets)
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; opened for signature in Vienna and New 
York on 3 March 1980 (1989).
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; opened for signature in Vienna on 26 September 
1986 (1987).
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; opened for 
signature in Vienna on 26 September 1986 (1990).
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy; adopted in Paris on 29 July 1960 (1972).
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field 
of Nuclear Energy; adopted in Brussels on 31 January 1963 (1977).
Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material; adopted in 
Brussels on 17 December 1971 (1991).
The 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention; 
adopted in Vienna on 21 September 1988 (1995).
Convention on Nuclear Safety; opened for signature in Vienna on 20 September 1994 (1996).
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management, adopted on 29 September 1997 in Vienna (2001).
Nordic Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement in Connection with Radiation Accidents; adopted in 
Vienna on 17 October 1963 (1965) Agreement on common Nordic guidelines on communications con-
cerning the siting of nuclear installations in border areas; adopted on 15 November1976 (1976).
The Agreement between Finland and Sweden on the guidelines to be followed while exporting nuclear 
material, technology or equipment, 4 March 1983 (FTS 20/1983).
Agreements relating to early notification of nuclear events and exchange of information on safety of 
nuclear facilities with Denmark (1987), Norway (1987), Sweden (1987), Germany (1993), the Russian Fed-
eration (1996) and Ukraine (1996).
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessments in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991).
As of 1 January 1995, Finland has been a member of the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EAEC or Euratom). Consequently, the following agreements are applied in Finland
The Agreement between the Government of Republic of Finland and the Government of Canada and 
Canada concerning the uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities and information transferred 
between Finland and Canada (FTS 43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by the Agreement with 
the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in the peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy, 6 October 1959, as amended.
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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS IN FINLAND APPENDIX 3
The Agreement between the Government of Republic of Finland and the Government of Australia con-
cerning the transfer of nuclear material between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). Substituted to the 
appropriate extent by the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the European Atomic 
Energy Community ty concerning transfer of nuclear material from Australia to the European Atomic 
Energy Community, 21 September 1981.
The Agreement for Cooperation with the Government of the Republic of Finland and the Government 
of the United States concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). Substituted to the appro-
priate extent by the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy with European 
Atomic Energy Community and the USA, 12 April 1996.
The Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the European Atomic 
Energy Community and the Government of Japan, 27 February 2006.
The Agreement Between the European Atomic Energy Community and the Cabinet of Ministers of 
Ukraine for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 28 April 2005.
The Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy Between the European Atomic 
Energy Community and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 4 December 2006.
The Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 21.10.2003
The Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy between the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of the Argentine Republic, 30.10.1997
The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 31.7.2013
The Agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of 
the United States of Brazil for cooperation concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy, 24.6.1965
Bilateral Safeguards Agreements made by Finland
The Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, entered into force on 1.1.2015 (FTS 5/2015).
The Agreement with the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic 
of Finland for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, entered into force on 6.4.2015 (FTS 
32/2015).
The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Between the Government 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the Republic of Finland, entered into force on 
3.6.2017 (FTS 48/2017).
The Agreement with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 
(FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III and X expired on 20 February 1999.
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INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS IN FINLAND APPENDIX 3
The Agreement with the Government of the Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) and the 
Government of the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (FTS 
39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 expired on 1.12.2004.
The Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the Re-
public of Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 41/70). Articles 
1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
The Agreement on implementation of the Agreement with Finland and Canada concerning the uses 
of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities and information transferred between Finland and Canada 
(FTS 43/84).
